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Selling Dreams. 
Advertising Strategies From Grands Magasins to Supermarkets in Ghent, 1900-1960 
 
Notwithstanding a recent upsurge of interest in the history of the department store, the problem of 
definition is yet unsolved1. Capturing the nature of this central institution in the transformation of consuming habits 
appears as a crucial problem. In a recent review of new studies on consumption history, it is being pointed out 
that ‘recognition of the dynamism of earlier retail environments; the extent of consumers’ pre-existing skills […]; 
and the sophistication of earlier consumption cultures blurs distinctions between department stores and earlier 
shops’. Recent studies, it is being stated, ‘draw attention to consumers’ own practices and knowledge at the 
expense of advertising images, as sources of the meaning of objects’. The author favours the argument of a 
‘greater integration of manipulationist and voluntarist accounts of consumer culture’2. What this makes clear is 
that the history of the grands magasins should go beyond the limits of the institution and its commercial practices, 
and be situated in a wider economic and cultural frame. 
First of all, there is no dilemma between the new commercial strategies of the stores and the cultural 
preferences of their bourgeois customers. The history of the grands magasins  starts humbly: its direct 
predecessors were small shops in clothing, maisons de nouveautés, stores for household tools and all sorts of 
stuff for interior decoration, small traders in chinaware and crystal objects… in other words, anything that was 
fashionable. Fashion is the pattern resulting of the strivings of many individuals for the pleasures of new 
experiences (e.g. the wearing of a new dress), without any central authority imposing criteria for novelty3. If this 
desire for novelty, characteristic of modernist Western culture, could be directed materialistically towards the 
possession and use of new objects, it would make up a promising source for profit-making. This is what small 
tradesmen found out since the eighteenth century4. As a result a new dimension was added to the old process of 
exchange known as ‘commerce’: desire. Goods could be emotionally promising besides rationally useful; 
seduction would be as good a commercial strategy as conviction5. This was necessarily paralleled by the surge of 
a stratum of the population that was modernist enough to long for novelty, materialist enough to project this upon 
objects, and prosperous enough to be able to afford those. In other words, part of the young nineteenth-century 
bourgeoisie. The successful commercialization of their modernist lifestyle is what we call today ‘consumer 
society’. The specific historical role of the grands magasins follows directly out of their capacity to fuse modernist 
bourgeois culture and commercial mass production into a dream marriage 6. The department store and the 
bourgeois enjoyed an interactive relation: bourgeois modernism was shaped out of a romantic heritage in an era 
of profound technological and commercial changes, of which the department store was a part. The latter in their 
turn adapted to the preferences of their customers, but at the same time fulfilled a role in a broader environment 
of institutions and practices that helped shape bourgeois culture. 
Second, the department store should not be seen separated from its natural environment, the whole of 
the retailing sector within a changing economy. The central feature of the grand magasin was its concentration of 
capital, enabling the store to enjoy the advantages of an economy of scale. The upsurge of department stores in 
the second half of the nineteenth century was reflecting the ongoing urbanization, accompanied by the 
development of new means of urban transport7. As such, the construction of the big city store offering a 
diversified range of goods was not the invention of a ingenious tradesman, rather it was a function of the social 
phenomenon of an ever denser and more mobile population in the presence of a free market on a capitalist bias. 
To fully make use of the concentration of capital, the new commercial firms needed to address the whole of the 
urban population, either by extensively relying on publicity (grands magasins), by constructing a chain of stores 
spread over the city (maisons à succursales), by offering the possibility of mail ordering (ventes à 
correspondance), or by a combination of those. Technically — before the breakthrough of conservation means 
such as canning or refrigerators — only the chain stores, dealing in smaller volumes and situated nearer to the 
customers, could cope with food products8, whereas the reliance of the others upon publicity would make them 
well suited for fashionable products. By the 1930s the field of retailing was cut up among no less than nine 
institutions. Numbers were still dominated by the traditional shopkeepers, and the divers formulas of ambulant 
commerce, such as peddlers or local markets. Exploiting the new possibilities for an economy of scale were, as 
mentioned above, the chain stores (food) and the department stores (non-food). The formula of mail ordering can 
be added here, though this sector was for the main part controlled by the department stores. Both the chain 
stores and the department stores were facing challengers, i.e. supermarkets and so-called fixed-price stores 
(magasins à prix uniques); both would more or less succesfully try to take over the new institutions, even if this 
involved a profound transformation of their firms. Dealing with economies of scale as well, but on a non-
capitalistic bias, were the cooperatives — mostly socialist attempts to establish a counter-economy — and, in a 
lesser way, the so-called économats, collectivised sales points within administrations or firms9. By then, 
competition between the small shopkeepers on the one hand, and department stores and cooperatives on the 
other hand, had become harsh enough to induce the government to prohibitive measures. Yet, even the most 
complex typology could not capture the whole range of commercial initiatives in the retailing sector. The 
department store was never an isolated institution with clear-cut features. Most companies were somewhere 
halfway on a scale of continuously changing retailing formulas, combining both old and new techniques. 
Third, the department store should be considered from a longer chronological perspective than merely 
the Belle Epoque. Extending its history into the twentieth century might illuminate the nature of the new sales 
machineries. In general, the evolution of the department stores during the twentieth century took place in three 
stages of expansion. The first wave of expansion was of a geographical kind. Following the lines of continuing 
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urbanization, the stores appeared outside the capital in smaller cities and new regional centres. The immediate 
result of this was a conflict with local shops that were still growing to become grands magasins. At an intermediary 
stage, to cope with local competition, and to prepare for further expansion, the main department stores — as far 
as this had not yet been the case — took on the structure of a limited liability company. Financial groups were 
invited to bring in new capital. The second wave of expansion was of a social kind. The department stores opened 
up new chains of so-called magasins à prix uniques (fixed-price stores), offering common goods for daily use, 
thereby addressing a lower and much broader stratum of the population. This evolution reflected the growth of 
discretionary income in the first decades of the twentieth century10. Another intermediary stage followed. In order 
to concentrate more capital and to prepare for further expansion, the stores made the first moves in what would 
end up in a general fusion of companies. The third wave of expansion then was of a commercial kind. By opening 
up food departments in their chains of ‘prix uniques’ stores, turning them into ‘supermarkets’, the department 
stores entered the vast food sector in an attempt to take over the whole of the retailing sector. This was made 
possible only by a structural change in the internal economy of the households, where the introduction of the 
refrigerator went hand in hand with smaller families, car mobility and working wives. As a result of this, the nature 
of the department stores changed profoundly. Expanding into smaller towns, lower strata of customers, and the 
quite unfashionable food sector, the succesful combination of modernist bourgeois appeals serving commercial 
goals faced a divorce. As the stores entered the era of the supermarket, the low prices argument gained 
importance to the detriment of lifestyle arguments, clearly reflected in publicity efforts of an ever worldlier outlook.  
Finally, part of the debate around the definition of the department store is being obscured by a national 
perspective. Without denying the influence of regional customs, I find it highly questionable to consider these 
institutions while ignoring their urban nature. The advent of the grand magasin was never a French, American, 
British or German phenomenon, but common to the whole of the Western industrializing, urbanizing and 
capitalistic world. Its founders were bourgeois, owning some capital and belonging to a cosmopolitan social 
stratum. Its environment was the city, not the nation11. In other words, a department store, grand magasin or 
Warenhaus, was an urban institution in the first place, rather than a national one. 
 
Drawing upon these remarks, I have investigated the twentieth century evolution of the grands magasins 
from an urban perspective. I deliberately selected a smaller provincial town somewhere in Europe (instead of the 
almost legendary companies of the major European capitals), more specifically Ghent, being the third of the five 
main Belgian urban agglomerations. Two aspects will be highlighted: firstly the institutional aspect, presenting an 
overview of the department stores present on the local scene, and their transformations during the period 1900-
1960; and secondly I will analyse their advertising in local papers, in an attempt to capture some aspects of their 
changing nature. I have considered only those stores which (a) called themselves ‘grand magasin’, (b) offered 
goods of several various kinds, e.g. clothing and furniture, and (c) functioned on a turnover basis through 
organizing regular special sales (solden), finally (d) excluding stores with a preponderate food department 
(Delhaize), and cooperative societies (Vooruit)12. 
 
From grands magasins to supermarkets 
Ghent, as a provincial town of less than 250,000 inhabitants, was never really the place to be as to profit-
making for the department stores. Still, being one of the five main urban environments in Belgium, it provides a 
good average local scene. Before the First World War only one of the big three of the grands magasins was 
present: the Grands Magasins aux Nouveautés A l’Innovation. The scene for the department stores was still 
pretty much a local one. The oldest of the Belgian department stores, Au Bon Marché, stood strong in Brussels 
and felt like having covered the best of the Belgian market with branches in Liege and Antwerp. Still, its bourgeois 
customers becoming more and more mobile, the store judged it proper to advertise in local papers in Ghent at 
regular intervals. The Grand Bazar du Bon Marché in Antwerp was the successful second initiative of the founder 
of La Maison Universelle in Ghent. However, until the grand bazars of Liege and Brussels would associate with 
their colleagues in Antwerp and Ghent in 1920, La Maison Universelle would never quite grow above its local 
proportions. This did not mean that A l’Innovation was the only competitive department store in Ghent before 
1920. As a matter of fact, it was facing quite a harsh competition from several local stores (displayed in italics in 
Table 1). 
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Table 1 — Grands Magasins advertising in Ghent, 1900-1960 
 1909 1919 1929 1939 1949 1959 
G.M. Réunis X      
Aux 
Nouveautés 
X      
G.M. du 
Louvre 
X      
La Maison 
Universelle 
X      
Au Beffroi X X X    
La 
Providence 
  X    
Frankenhoff & 
C° 
  X    
Au Bon 
Marché 
X  X  X  
A l'Innovation X X X X X X 
Grand Bazar   X X X X 
Sarma   X X X X 
L. van 
Goitsenhoven 
  X X X  
Aux Variétés   X    
Agence 
Dechenne 
  X    
G.M. du 
Louvre (Fr.) 
 X X    
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Apart from La Maison Universelle, founded in 1882 and predecessor of the later Grand Bazar13, we find 
six local competitors in Ghent claiming to be grands magasins. All of them were dating back from the nineteenth 
century, and would still be in the running after the First World War, though neither of them as department store 
anymore by that time. Each of them was presenting itself in 1909 as grand magasin, offering goods of different 
kinds, and taking part in clearance sales (solden) by the end of the season. Several of them were also, following 
the example of the Brussels’ store Au Bon Marché, trying to gain some commercial advantage by imitating the 
names of famous French grands magasins. The background of the local department stores was initially a small 
shop, run by ambitious young tradesmen. By the end of the 1920s financial companies would step in and try to 
join the lucrative scene of the department stores. Still, none of the local stores would survive the crisis years of 
the early 1930s and the sharpened competition with the department stores from Brussels. 
The local department stores came out of four different backgrounds. First, the most common origin of a 
department store was the fashion shop (maison de nouveautés). The Grands Magasins ‘Aux Nouveautés’  was 
founded in 1909 when O. Dupont took over E. Boulet’s small fashion shop14, dating back from 189015. By 1929 
however, it had shrunk again into a modest clothes’ shop. The same happened to anothermagasin de nouveautés 
presenting itself in 1909 as grand magasin. K. Ledant’s fashion shop Au Grand Louvre, founded around 188416, 
proudly presented itself as the Grands Magasins du Louvre in 190917. The sought for confusion with the French 
department store of the same name was not much of a help though, as the shop turned out to have taken a step 
back after the First World War. A second type of shop was the haberdashery (mercerie). In Ghent only the Van 
Gheluwe haberdashery, in business since early 186618, tried to become a department store. S. Van Gheluwe was 
advertising as the Grands Magasins Au Beffroi in 190919, but died soon after. The shop was continued by O. 
Gevaert and remained competitive even by the end of the 1920s. A third type were the chinaware and crystal 
shops (magasins de porcelaines et cristaux). Les Grands Magasins Réunis Ad. Dangotte was dating back from 
188320, when Adolphe Dangotte seems to have taken over his father’s business, a chinaware and crystal shop 
which was first mentioned in 186321 by the local almanac. Adolphe Dangotte added household tools and furniture 
to the store’s stock. In 1914 the shop was transformed into a limited liability company22, dealing with ‘toutes 
opérations relatives aux arts décoratifs et ameublement’. It still existed after the First World War, but seemed to 
have withdrawn from the department store category. Finally, by 1929 two more local stores turned up. Both were 
credit houses (maisons de crédit) this time23, dating back from the beginning of the century. The Vlaamsch 
Crediethuis Frankenhoff et Co. was publishing rather modest, be it frequent, communications that could hardly be 
called advertisements. La Providence on the other hand, run by C. Vanex, seemed determined to conquer its part 
of the market, advertising abundantly. This last category was significant for a new interest in the retailing sector 
from the part of the financial world, coinciding with the transformations the Brussels’ department stores were 
undergoing in this period. Yet none of the local stores would succeed in a breakthrough. 
The local scene of department stores in Ghent was bound to be dominated by stores from other Belgian 
cities, mostly the capital, Brussels. Au Bon Marché, owned by the family Vaxelaire, was the first Belgian grand 
magasin, in business since François Vaxelaire and his wife took over a store of the Thiéry brothers in 1866. Its 
home town was Brussels, and with branches opening up between 1881 and 1886 in Liege and Antwerp, the major 
cities in Belgium were being covered. The store prospered, and by the turn of the century it had left all of its 
competitors at a safe distance. The Vaxelaires seem to have become even a little too confident, for Au Bon 
Marché would not show much innovative enthusiasm anymore. Innovation then, was the name of the Grands 
Magasins aux Nouveautés A l'Innovation, founded in 1897 by Jules Bernheim and the Meyer brothers, right 
beside Au Bon Marché in Brussels’ main street. The store showed very dynamically, addressing itself to a broader 
range of customers and opening up no less than seven branches in the following decade, among which in Liege, 
Ghent and Antwerp. The third main department store of the period finally, knew a rather complex early history. 
Grand Bazar was the name in 1885 of the Antwerp store of Adolph Kileman, the founder of La Maison Universelle 
in Ghent in 1882. It was also the name of August Tiriard’s store in Liege, founded in 1885, and of the limited 
liability company founded on his initiative at the Brussels’ Boulevard Anspach two years later24. In the years to 
come the three companies would become financially intertwined. 
What these stores had in common was that they did not grow out of smaller shops, but were founded 
directly as department stores25. By the beginning of the twentieth century they had already undergone a first wave 
of expansion: Au Bon Marché had three branches, A l’Innovation seven and the Grands Bazars four. This type of 
expansion would continue all throughout the century. 
In 1920 some important developments would prepare the department stores for a second wave of 
expansion. First of all, Bernheim would succeed in taking over the giant department store of German origin Tietz 
in Brussels, beating its opponent Au Bon Marché with an all-or-nothing bid of 36,5 millon francs26. The operation 
was prepared by having financial groups from Brussels taking share in the store’s new form as a limited liability 
company27. Still, Bernheim’s A l'Innovation was almost ruined, struggling for several years to overcome its debts. 
But when it finally did, the reborn A l'Innovation as good as equalized the size of Au Bon Marché. A second event 
took place the same year when Victor Tiriard succeeded in connecting his Grands Bazars of Liege and Brussels 
to those of Ghent and Antwerp by taking an important share in the newly founded limited liability company Grands 
Bazars Réunis Anvers-Gand28. Au Bon Marché was rather late to react to these developments, turning into a 
limited liability company as late as 192729. Having attracted new capital, the department stores were ready for a 
new type of expansion. 
A new formula was being prepared for the department stores. The magic word was prix uniques. The 
principle of prix uniques meant that sales would be concentrated on basic issues, articles that were certain always 
to sell in very high quantities, combined with very low profit margins, and a minimum of general expenses (sober 
architecture and a high degree of self-service)30. In other words, the new stores were radicalizing the rational 
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principles of sales organisation that allready had been constitutive to the grands magasins in the previous 
century. But while the grands magasins had concentrated on luxury articles, addressing the most obvious part of 
the market, the wealthy bourgeois, the magasins à prix uniques offerred simple products for daily use, addressing 
a much broader part of the population. ‘Prix uniques’ was not a European invention. It went back to the American 
fixed-price stores, e.g. Woolworth’s ‘five and ten cents’. While it originally meant that all products offerred were 
within a specific, low price category, it seemed only a matter of time before the new stores would overlap with the 
grands magasins. By the 1930s most European countries had their chain of fixed-price stores31. The first initiative 
in Belgium came from Jean Van Gijsel, creating Sarma, a limited liability company, in 192832. The creation of 
Sarma, as a fourth big name in the world of the Belgian grands magasins, caused some consternation, as both 
Bernheim and Vaxelaire understood very well the possibilities inherent in the new formula. Vaxelaire’s Au Bon 
Marché was the first to react, with the creation of its own fixed-proce store in 1929, while Bernheim tried to set up 
an international structure around A l'Innovation33. Both failed, however, and neither of the two seeming capable of 
formulating an answer to the Sarma challenge, in 1933 the old rivals decided to fuse their supermarket initiatives 
into Prisunic-Priba34. Even then, while the Grands Bazars were to remain absent from the new scene, Prisunic-
Priba would find it hard to get ahead of Sarma, as the leaders of the old grands magasins found it not easy to lay 
off the old skin and apply the prix uniques principle in a consistent way — hesitations of this kind Jean Van Gijsel 
being unaware of in his brand new company. 
 
Yet, before the war of the department stores was about to fully break loose, the Belgian government 
decided to interfere. The international economic crisis of the early 1930s had intensified the complaints of the 
traditional sector of small shopkeepers against the new retailing structures, pushing the governments of several 
European countries to take prohibitive measures35. The Loi de Cadenas (Padlock Law) was passed early 1937, 
forbidding expansion of the department stores of any sort. Not until the end of 1960 the prohibition would come to 
an end36, in the meantime slowing down movements in the world of the grands magasins (though the stores 
proved to be rather creative in getting round the prohibitive measures on several occasions)37. 
 
Slowly, the department stores would be integrating food departments in their fixed-price stores, thereby entering a 
third wave of expansion. By 1960 the sector of the department stores had become somewhat simplified. First of 
all, Sarma had not realized the breakthrough, lapping behind of the big three. Jean Van Gijsel had left the board 
of directors, to join the Grands Magasins de la Bourse, the only independent grand magasin of the old days 
remaining. Notwithstanding a careful form of cooperation Sarma-Bourse was to stay on a humble fourth place. 
The three main stores, Au Bon Marché, A l'Innovation and the Grands Bazars, had shaken off all of their 
competitors, but the rank order had changed since 1929. 
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Table 2 — The main Grands Magasins compared 1929-195938 
 Capital  Balance Gross Profit Branches 
1929     
Au Bon Marché 40 216 9 4 
A l'Innovation 75 210 18 10 
Grands Bazars 48 194 14 6 
     
1959     
Au Bon Marché 200 1413 67 5 
A l'Innovation 600 1969 93 12 
Grands Bazars 370 2364 61 19 
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While the Grands Bazars had done very well, becoming the leading department stores by 1959, and A 
l'Innovation had managed to maintain its second position, Au Bon Marché had lost its leading position and was 
even getting seriously behind of the two others. Therefore it was no surprise that it would be the Grand Bazars to 
realize the breakthrough in the transformation of the grands magasins into supermarkets. Perhaps the complex 
structure of the Grands Bazars affiliation had slowed down the developing of their own chain of supermarkets. In 
1960 the Grand Bazar d’Anvers39 decided to go on its own, creating G.B. Supermarchés40. While the Grands 
Bazars of Liege and Brussels drifted away as the affiliation was falling apart, the Antwerp bazar was making its 
own success-story. The fusion in 1968 of the old Grand Bazar d’Anvers into its own supermarket chain41 was to 
mark the symbolic and final end of the era of the grands magasins. As the gap was widening, the former rivals of 
A l'Innovation and Au Bon Marché faced no other way out but a fusion. The newly created Inno-BM in 1969 was 
worth one and a half billion francs42, but as its supermarket chain Priba-Unic was still lagging behind, within a few 
years it had lost its leading position again to the rapidly growing G.B. Entreprises. 
Still, the department stores used to be not the only retailing companies. There had also been the 
maisons à succursales, loosely affiliated chains of food stores, and the cooperative societies, mostly socialist 
attempts to create a counter-economy. One of the former, Delhaize-De Leeuw, was not to sit quietly as G.B. 
Entreprises was trying to take over the whole of the retailing market, including the food sector. Very soon, G.B. 
Entreprises considered it wise to enter a fusion with the former competitors of Inno-BM, creating GB-Inno-BM in 
197443. In 1987 finally, Sarma, which had been taken over in 1969 by an American multinational, J.C. Penney, 
was to join the ranks of GB-Inno-BM. Everything had come together: as the grands magasins had been 
expanding according to the supermarket/prix uniques principle, they had not only conquered a greater part of the 
retailing market in all of its sectors, they had also lost their former modernist identity, until only the purely 
commercial principle remained: the bigger you are, the more you will get, leading them into a general fusion. 
 
Advertising in Local Papers: Some Remarks 
In a paradoxal way, advertising appetite was shrinking as the stores were expanding. The highest degree 
of publicity fever was being reached in the late 1920s44. There has probably never been more advertising in 
Belgian history than during these years, with the exception maybe of the present decade. The four main 
department stores were facing severe competition from two sides, both from the old local shops, in their last 
attempt to conquer a place on the grands magasins scene, and from new companies on a national scale, as the 
ever growing consumer market had attracted attention from the side of capital-owners. Among the latter (category 
‘Others’ in Figure 1) we notice the Etablissements Louis Van Goitsenhoven, owned by a captain of industry of 
modest scale specialized in cinema, gramophones, photography etc., as well as Aux Variétés, a chain with no 
less than 24 branches in 1929, owned by the family De Baerdemacker. The line of evolution towards a peak in 
1929 is to become clearer if the war difficulties both in the first half of 1919 and the second half of 1939 are taken 
into account, reducing publicity efforts almost to zero. The diminishing advertising activity after 1929 is mainly due 
to the lower pressure of competition. The local stores were being wiped off the market, soon to be followed by all 
other competitors of the old grands magasins, with the notable exception of Sarma. All of this was in sharp 
contrast with the case of Brussels, where competition remained fierce all throughout the period. 
Whereas in 1909 the local stores were still dominating the local publicity scene, to the detriment of Au 
Bon Marché and A l'Innovation, this had gone done to one third by 1929, and was reduced to zero a decade later, 
as department stores in Ghent had outgrown the local level. The four main department stores were facing a new 
challenge from 1929 on, the market being split up into three, with local stores, the four main grands magasins, 
and the other department stores equalizing each other. By 1939 however, the ‘big four’ had recaptured a major 
part of the market, while after the Second World War they shared a virtual monopoly in department store 
advertising. As Au Bon Marché did not dispose of a branch in Ghent, and Sarma was according to the prix 
uniques principle less inclined to maintain an image through advertising, it was A l'Innovation and Grand Bazar 
fighting it out from 1929 on. The dominance of Grand Bazar seemed established by 1959, mirroring the 
commercial successes of the store. Remarkable in 1959 finally, is the entry of the first maison à succursales, 
Delhaize, in the department store publicity, presenting large and abundant advertisements, almost exact copies of 
the style the former grands magasins had been displaying up till then. 
A notable difference between the main department stores and their competitors on both the local and the 
national level occurs when comparing the frequency of publishing of a single ad. The commercial successes of 
the former in the long run might also be explained by the elaboration of their advertising strategies. The main 
grands magasins took the trouble of adapting their publicity messages to the concrete commercial occasions they 
were advertising, thereby covering a much broader array of arguments and motives for buying towards the public, 
whereas their competitors employed much more general ads, being published over and over again. 
The frequency rate of the four main department stores is remarkably consistent all throughout the 
covered period, the average always below three, whereas the others are scoring averages of up to twenty. After 
the Second World War ads being published more than once have become exceptional. 
The same conclusions apply when considering the size of the advertisements. The size of the 
advertisements seems to be dropping when a store feels its competitive force slipping through its fingers, as with 
the local stores after the First World War, the national competitors after the Second World War, and Sarma in 
1959. Still, as a rule the advertisements of the department stores were large size45, illustrating the importance that 
was being attributed to advertising. By 1959 a small size ad had become almost unthinkable to the department 
stores. 
Faithful to their roots as maisons de nouveautés, the fashion seasons were still dominating the 
advertising practices of the grands magasins. The month of June, the yearly occasion for solden (clearance sales) 
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was traditionally a peak period as for publicity. October on the other hand was the beginning of the new season 
and the main sales month. Lesser highdays for commercial publicity were the end of November with Sinterklaas46; 
the end of December and the beginning of January, as Christmas and New Year’s day were shaking hands with 
the wintersolden; while the end of August and the beginning of September seemed a good opportunity to sell 
some school accessories. In May any occasion was good enough to end the low season: Mother’s Day, 
Communion, Pentecost or even Easter, spring cleaning or the first warm days. 
The common profile of a department store advertisement thus appears as a large ad, created for a 
special occasion, which was often solden. Still, even in the low season advertising never quite fell away, as the 
difference in advertising intensity between high and low season was permanently less than five percent. Going 
deeper into the occasions for which advertisements were published, an evolution becomes clear. Whereas solden 
was the motive for almost half of the advertisements in 1909, by the end of the covered period it had dropped to 
less than ten percent. Advertisements for special occasions, such as Communion, Easter, the new school year, 
Santa Claus, Christmas etc., were following more or less the same line. Publicity for specific departments or a 
limited array of articles on the other hand was dominant from 1929 on and had become the standard by 1959. In 
other words, as the scope of the department stores was expanding from an emphasis on fashionable articles to 
the whole of the retailing market, the stores were becoming less and less dependent on seasonal turnover, and 
more and more inclined to build an image through specific wares as to compensate for the loss of their modernist 
identity. 
An interesting matter, finally, is the question as to what kind of customers the department stores were 
addressing through their publicity. The advertisements do not provide a convincing answer here, as references to 
customers are either absent, or deliberately up-scaled to one level above the actual social situation of the 
potential client. However, as I chose to consider two papers situated in complementary social settings, the 
number of advertisements being published in only one of the two papers might be an indication of the kind of 
customers the department stores were aiming at. Among the local papers in Ghent we find La Flandre Libérale, 
addressed to the liberal, French-speaking bourgeoisie, and Vooruit, a Dutch-speaking socialist worker’s paper. 
The results as displayed in Figure 6 are probably exagerated, as the French-speaking paper had become 
quite outmoded after the Second World War, and was much less interesting for advertisers. Notwithstanding this, 
the evolution is quite clear, and illustrative of another expansion. 
 
The Seduction of the Consumer Through Advertisements 
Following the line of argument Marchand is developing in his remarkable analysis of American 
advertising in the 1920s and 1930s, modern advertising should be seen as undergoing a fundamental change 
after the First World War47. Product-oriented ads, rationally stressing the utility dimension of a product, were 
gradually being replaced by consumer-oriented ads, emotionally underlining the pleasure dimension of an article. 
The most primitive form of the former kind was the so-called brand-name publicity, simply depicting the brand 
name of the product, incidentally accompanied by a view of the factory or its owner. A somewhat more 
sophisticated variant was the reason-why technique, including a text which summed up all sorts of arguments why 
the article should be bought. The main disadvantage in this line of advertising was its rational character, inviting 
the consumer to rationally consider the arguments, thereby opening up the possibility for the latter to come up 
with counter-arguments. A much more efficient way of treating the client was to make an appeal to his or her 
emotions, detracting the attention from the product by stressing the effects the article could have upon the life of 
the consumer rather than the inherent qualities of the product. In other words, what counted was seducing the 
customer, selling sex instead of soap, personality instead of a hat, or adventure instead of lemonade. In order to 
avoid any rational considerations, and to maximalize the appeal to the consumer, pictures were by far preferred in 
this kind of advertising above text.  
It would not be unreasonable to suppose that as commercialization was expanding with the department 
stores, some of the transformation mentioned above was likely to show up in their publicity. Were they 
emphasizing product-oriented or consumer-oriented advertising? If we assume a price-list included in the ad to be 
a basic form of reason-why approach, and the presence of graphical elements as to be attempts to seduce the 
consumer, then the answer is ‘both’, as shown in Figure 7. 
The switch seems to have occurred during the 1920s, paralleling the evolution in American advertising as 
described by Marchand. The common use of graphics in an advertisement was a handful of drawings of models 
showing off the clothing mentioned in the accompanying price-list. Sceneries from the life of an average 
consumer detracting attention away from the product were rather exceptional, only to be found well after the 
Second World War. The grands magasins, as contrasted with the role they seemingly fulfilled before the turn of 
the century, were no forerunners as to modern advertising. Part of this should be attributed to the prix uniques 
principle: as the department stores intended to maximalize the possibilities of an economy of scale flowing from 
the concentration of capital in their hands, attention was being concentrated upon the low price argument. 
Therefore the price-list technique, introduced by A l'Innovation as early as 1909, was not to lose importance as 
modern advertising found its way to the Belgian publicity scene, quite the contrary. 
In 1909 we find the department stores disposing of the largest and most frequent advertisements in the 
papers, as such leading the publicity scene. Still the contents of these ads are certainly not innovating. 
Forerunners in this period as for the latest advertising techniques are the pills and powders of the quack 
medecine kind, introducing huge slogans, cartoons, seductive illustrations and even the first modest photographs. 
Generally speaking stores are much more present on the publicity market, but brand-names are offering the most 
innovative ads (Figure 8). One modest example of graphical advertising is found in the Santa Claus ad of A 
l'Innovation with its title in calligraphic setting (Figure 9). 
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By 1919 the same store seems to have reached a sort of standard lay-out for its advertisements. An 
average department store ad of these years consisted of a frame, in which the huge logo of the store was 
followed by a smaller heading, and surrounded with a price-list (Figure 10). A decade later we notice a 
breakthrough of graphical elements, adding font effects and illustrations to the former concept (Figure 11). 
Thereby a standard was set surviving up till today, be it that the drawings were replaced by photographs after the 
Second World War, taking in an ever growing share of the ad’s surface. 
Yet A l'Innovation was certainly not the most progressive of the department stores. Its main challengers 
Sarma and Van Goitsenhoven were much more eager to integrate graphical elements in their ads from 1929 on. 
One of the consequences of the rapid transformation of advertising techniques in these years was the cooperative 
societies getting seriously behind. Until then the latter had taken care of following the department stores publicity 
efforts by nearby, to the extent that the freethinking Vooruit did not hesitate to advertise the celebration of the 
catholic feast of Communion, or simply to counterfeit the more elaborate ads of the department stores. 
The stores were still prominently present in 1929, but they were beaten this time by a range of 
technological products entering the mass-market, especially radios, cigarettes, kitchen-ranges and vacuum 
cleaners. But most of all these were the automobile years, in for almost half of the publicity market, while 
cosmetics and hygiene articles had followed up the pills and powders in the quack sector. In this wilderness of pu-
blicity, the grands magasins were good followers, but never fore-runners. Several of the modern advertising 
techniques mentioned by Marchand were being applied, e.g. elaborated reason-why, endorsements of famous 
people, or scare cope pointing out what could happen if the consumer would not buy the product. More was to 
come in the following decades, such as the use of comics to picture daily scenes from the consumer’s life, radiant 
beams of sacral light coming out of the sky as icons of the advertising world, or ads disguised as editorial copy. 
Yet the grands magasins would go their own way. 
Several other strategies were tried out. Au Bon Marché introduced a formula in 1927 whereby visitors 
from out of town could have their traveling expenses covered by the store if spending a certain amount of money 
there. La Providence soon followed the example, some time later followed by A l’Innovation. The latter store then 
again was well known for its in-built tea-room, offering its customers the full scale of the enjoyments a day out 
should offer. A l'Innovation was also supplementing its advertisements by tiny communications in the small ads 
sector of the paper. Finally, in this period several of the department stores were diversifying their advertising 
strategies as different advertisements were being created according to the public aimed at, an experiment 
however that was not to be prolonged in the following years. 
By 1939 Grand Bazar had become the most innovative of the department stores, regularly experimenting 
with recognizable illustrations, intriguing headings or slogans of striking proportions (Figure 12). Still the abundant 
style of advertising of the 1920s was soon to disappear: the decrease of publicity in the papers in Ghent after 
1929 is striking. Eventually by 1959 even the cinema announcings had become tiny. Moreover, several 
advertisements that year prove to be a copy of those used a decade earlier. The only change here was the final 
breakthrough of photographs instead of drawings as the main source for illustrations. By then the grands 
magasins had settled in a two-hearted advertising strategy: sober price-lists accompanied by genteel models, 
icons for female seduction. As such the newborn supermarket owners found a compromise, convincing through 
low prices and seducing through genteel images, thereby paying a last tribute to their modernist roots with the 
‘genteel classes’ of the nineteenth century. 
 
Conclusion 
As argued above, the specific historical role of the grands magasins follows directly out of their capacity 
to fuse modernist bourgeois culture and commercial mass production into a dream marriage. The 
commercialization of modernism took place in the heyday of the department store, the last decades of the 
nineteenth century. 
From the 1920s on, a major change was taking place. As consumption was on the rise, paralleling the 
welfare society coming into being, the department stores, with a high concentration of capital in their hands, were 
not to remain indifferent. Following the prix uniques principle, expansion was to take place on three levels. 
Geographically webs of ever more local branches were created; commercially the emphasis upon fashionable 
goods faded away as basic products like food stuff were taken in; and finally socially the department stores were 
to come out of their bourgeois background, addressing themselves to a much broader stratum of the population. 
By 1960 the transformation of the former grands magasins had become irreversible, destroying most of 
the historical identity of the stores, and leading them into a confrontation with the maisons à succursales. Still, as 
contrasted with the end of the nineteenth century, during this second phase of the development of a consumer 
society from the 1920s on, the grands magasins were no longer fore-runners, merely good followers as stores in 
general were making way for brand-names on the publicity market. Still, paying a last tribute to their social and 
cultural roots, the grands magasins found a compromise in an advertising style of their own, convincing through 
low prices and seducing through genteel images. 
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